"The IAA aims to give the EU its first industrial policy" (N. Makaroff, Strategic Perspectives)

First announced for December 2025, the Industrial Accelerator Act has been postponed three times, and is finally expected to come into force on 04/03/2026: what were the points on which negotiations lasted?

The Industrial Accelerator Act is a long-awaited piece of legislation, designed to save European industry from competition from other countries, notably China, by including a dimension of European preference in the public procurement of member states when it comes to strategic industries, i.e. those that are key to Europe's energy and industrial sovereignty (battery components, heat pumps, solar panels, green steel, aluminium, for example). This already exists in the defence and health sectors. The aim is to raise industry's share of European GDP to 20% by 2035, compared with 14.3% today (and 17.4% in 2000).

It is the brainchild of Stéphane Séjourné, European Commissioner for prosperity and industrial strategy, and has been the subject of tough negotiations between nine different Commission DGs. Initially it was called the Industrial Decarbonisation Accelerator Act, and as a sign of changing priorities at European level, the term "decarbonisation" has disappeared, even though it still focuses to a large extent on cleantech and decarbonisation tools.

For a year now, discussions have been focusing on the definition and modalities of "Made in Europe".

For the past year, discussions have focused on the definition and modalities of "Made in Europe", in the sense of the European Economic Area (Schengen Area, with Iceland, Norway and Lichtenstein), and have recently evolved towards a "Made with Europe" vision, including partner countries such as Japan or Chile on a case-by-case basis within the scope of the Industrial Acceleration Act. It is this new, more open approach that is driving debate today. And in particular the definition of partnerships, which will be negotiated on a case-by-case basis: this is of great interest to the United Kingdom, as well as Switzerland, for example.

The other subject of debate is how to control and open up the economy to direct foreign investment (FDI): to what extent should, or can, Europe require foreign investors to invest in different stages of the value chain on its soil? If not, there is a clear risk that "screwdriver factories" will be set up to assemble components produced elsewhere.

What are the main obstacles to ending the Industrial Accelerator Act?

Virtually all the stakeholders are waiting for it: European businesses, which are calling for a minimum of security in a world that has changed a great deal in the last year (1,150 business leaders have signed an opinion piece to this effect); the European Parliament, where the EPP is waiting for a text that goes in the direction of simplification; the Member States, with 18 countries, including France, Spain and Italy, coming together on the Buy European principle. But it is at Commission level that the blockages are the greatest.

The notion of European preference is indeed a new idea at Commission level, but many countries in the world apply national preference policies.

The notion of European preference is indeed a new idea at Commission level, but many countries in the world apply national preference policies: the United States, first and foremost, with the Buy American Act (BAA) and the Build American Buy American Act (BABA); China, where state-owned companies account for 25% of GDP; but also India, Indonesia, Brazil, etc.

It therefore seems logical that, in a multipolar and tense world, the European Union should equip itself with the same tools as its competitors and partners. Having succeeded in creating a single market of 450 million consumers is one of the great achievements of the European Union; the challenge now is not to turn it into a supermarket designed to sell off Chinese overcapacity! We saw this with steel: European production fell by 20% at the same time as imports rose by 20%. This is why the Industrial Accelerator Act is so important: for example, it will be a prerequisite for the emergence of a European battery industry. Players such as Verkor and ACC exist, but they need to be allowed to compete on equal terms with their rivals.

When will the IAA come into effect, and what are the conditions for its success?

It would take the form of a regulation, and could therefore be implemented as early as 2029: this is a short timescale, on the scale of the Union, and necessary in view of the urgency of the situation. Secondly, while it is possible to modulate the percentages of Made In (or With) Europe components incorporated into final products, it is vital to limit the room for manoeuvre of the Member States, as this could lead to an 'à la carte' Made In Europe, synonymous with fragmentation of the Common Market. We are currently negotiating the 28^th regime, which will enable innovative companies in the Member States to scale immediately to an European status and perimeter: it is therefore vital to maintain this European scale, because it is quite simply the critical size needed in today's world!